---
title: "Questions raised about NDAs blocking UAP disclosure to President Trump"
url: "https://usubjects.com/article/questions-raised-about-ndas-blocking-uap-disclosure-to-president-trump-3210"
updated: "2026-08-03T16:02:49.689Z"
description: "The article questions why nondisclosure agreements would prevent UAP information from being shared with President Trump. It frames the issue as a broader concern about transparency and who is allowed to know details about UFO/UAP disclosures."
sources: ["https://avi-loeb.medium.com/why-are-there-ndas-prohibiting-uap-disclosure-to-president-trump-f86ae199567d"]
licence: "All rights reserved"
---

# Questions raised about NDAs blocking UAP disclosure to President Trump

Published: 2026-08-02  
Source: [Google News](https://avi-loeb.medium.com/why-are-there-ndas-prohibiting-uap-disclosure-to-president-trump-f86ae199567d)

### Overview

Questions about **who can be briefed on UAP information** resurfaced this week after Avi Loeb highlighted a July 31 memo from Aaron Lukas, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, that directs government personnel to provide UAP-related material to the **Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters (PURSUE)** Task Force and the Pentagon’s **All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO)**. The most striking language in the memo, according to Loeb, is its apparent waiver of secrecy constraints: **“any previous or existing NDAs prohibiting disclosure to the President, are no longer in force”** and those with relevant knowledge should report it to AARO or an authorized PURSUE representative.

The memo has prompted a broader question: **Why would any nondisclosure agreement exist that prevents UAP information from being shared with the president in the first place?** Loeb frames that issue not as proof of extraordinary UAP claims, but as a matter of governance and transparency. If the information is real, he argues, then the public should know why it was kept from the nation’s highest elected official.

### Executive authority and classified access

Under the normal structure of U.S. national security authority, the **president sits at the top of the classification system**. Classification rules are designed around the idea that the commander in chief can be briefed on sensitive programs when necessary, even if access is highly restricted within the bureaucracy. Loeb notes that a document specifically barring disclosure to the president would be unusual, and, if such an arrangement truly existed, potentially **unlawful or at least highly irregular**.

That concern is central to the article’s argument: the question is not just whether UAP data exists, but **how access to that data is controlled**. If the executive branch has built a system in which certain compartments are effectively insulated from presidential oversight, that would raise serious institutional questions regardless of what the underlying evidence ultimately shows. For Loeb, the issue is one of **civilian control, chain of command, and accountability**.

### Possible explanations for the secrecy

The article outlines several bureaucratic mechanisms that could explain the apparent contradiction without necessarily implying a deliberate effort to block a president specifically. One possibility is the existence of **Special Access Programs (SAPs)** or **Unacknowledged Special Access Programs (USAPs)**, where access is tightly controlled and based on a narrow “need to know.” In that environment, a new president may not be automatically read into every compartment unless someone initiates the process.

A second possibility is that relevant materials are held under **private contractor NDAs**, rather than standard government classification rules. In that case, the legal constraints would stem from **contract law and trade-secret protections**, not the same authority structure that governs executive branch records. Loeb suggests that such arrangements could create a gray area where UAP-related information is effectively hidden inside corporate or subcontractor relationships, complicating efforts to disclose it through normal government channels.

### Transparency concerns going forward

The broader significance of the memo, Loeb argues, is that it underscores how **UAP disclosure is no longer just about sightings or sensor data**. It is also about the architecture of secrecy itself: who is allowed to know, who controls access, and whether those rules can override democratic oversight. The new directive to route information through PURSUE and AARO suggests an attempt to centralize reporting, but it also implies that old restrictions may have been more extensive than previously acknowledged.

For now, the memo has intensified scrutiny of the hidden mechanics surrounding UAP programs. Even if the underlying claims remain unverified, the question raised is concrete: **if there were NDAs that blocked disclosure to the president, who created them, under what authority, and why were they allowed to persist?**

## Provenance

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