NRO appoints PURSUE director and addresses extraterrestrial hypothesis
ILLUSTRATIVE RECONSTRUCTION // NOT EVIDENCE

NRO Establishes UAP Reporting Role

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has appointed Jonathan R. Jeffries as its PURSUE Designee, according to an unclassified memorandum dated Sept. 28, 2026. PURSUE refers to the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters, an executive-branch initiative intended to collect, review and potentially support the release of information concerning unidentified anomalous phenomena.

The memorandum, described in material released by Dr. Robert McGwier, directs NRO personnel and programs to report UAP-related cases immediately. Jeffries is identified as director of the agency’s Mission Integration Directorate, with more than three decades of experience involving space and airborne platforms, electronic warfare, systems engineering, and program acquisition. The document provides what appears to be a formal name and reporting function for the NRO’s PURSUE interface.

Reference to Extraterrestrial Hypotheses

The memo’s definition of UAP is notable for explicitly including possible non-human origins. It describes UAP as “any abnormal phenomena with respect to known physics, current technology, or known human technology sources” that may suggest non-human origins involving materials, object behavior, information or communication.

The definition also lists terms previously used in government and public discussions, including unidentified aerial phenomena, unidentified flying objects, “aliens,” “extra-terrestrials” and non-human intelligence. Direct references to extraterrestrial explanations are unusual in official U.S. government documents, although the language does not establish that any reported incident has been confirmed as extraterrestrial. Rather, it places that possibility within the range of hypotheses to be evaluated.

The reporting process outlined in the memorandum requires personnel to submit information to the NRO’s PURSUE coordinator or a designated email address. Reports are then to be reviewed by the PURSUE Working Group, which will determine appropriate action and coordinate with relevant offices, including the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARO.

Security and Congressional Interest

The document also describes a confidential reporting route through the NRO Inspector General’s Office. It emphasizes that existing nondisclosure agreements remain in force, except when personnel communicate with authorized AARO or PURSUE representatives. Classified or sensitive information must be transmitted through approved secure systems and not released publicly. AARO has similarly warned that classified material should not be submitted through its public reporting portal.

The broader report places the NRO development within increased congressional and executive-branch interest in UAP information. It includes claims that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. received briefings on the subject, although the scope, source and official status of those alleged briefings remain unclear in the material available. The report also discusses possible congressional testimony concerning a 2025 UAP incident, but does not establish whether testimony has been scheduled, what evidence would be presented, or whether the event has been independently verified.

Earlier Intelligence Records

Another issue raised is the reported discovery by the Defense Intelligence Agency of records associated with the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program—or AAWSAP—which operated from 2007 to 2012. The reported records could provide additional context for how earlier defense investigations handled UAP-related material, but their contents, classification status and relationship to current programs were not fully detailed.

The NRO memorandum does not by itself resolve the long-running debate over the nature of UAP reports. Its significance lies instead in the creation of a defined internal reporting chain and the explicit coordination between PURSUE, the NRO and AARO. Whether the system leads to meaningful declassification, improved oversight or new evidence will depend on how reports are assessed and what information can legally be released.